Introduction
Important institutional changes are expected to take place in Europe in the very near Union to 17 additional countries, 15 of which are formerly satellite states of the Soviet empire. A major concern is how to adapt institutions created for an initial core of 6 countries to a quasi-continent. There is indeed a widespread belief that, under the current institutional rules, an enlarged EU may not function at all, creating the risk of collapse of what has been a major success story on the European continent. The Nice Treaty contains institutional decisions relative to enlargement, setting the weights of the 12 potential new entrants in the European Council (and also in the Parliament and in the Commission) and deciding on the majority rules in the Council. There is however a large consensus that the Nice Treaty did not really address the issues of the necessary reforms of the European Union to make it governable with 27 countries.
Much of the research on the effects of enlargement on the functioning of the European Union has focused on the dangers of paralysis of decision-making in the Council. Thus for example, Baldwin et al. (2001) showed that with enlargement to 27 EU countries, the passage probability 1 of a decision in the Council would go from 7.8%
under the current rules with 15 EU countries to 2.1% under the Nice rules, a clear deterioration. However, there has hardly been any focus on the effects of enlargement on the functioning of the European Parliament (EP). This neglect is certainly due to the fact that the main decision-making body in the EU is the Council. The power of the EP in European legislative decision-making has remained so far very limited compared to the powers of normal parliaments. However, its powers have increased quite steadily over time. The co-decision procedure by which both the EP and the Council must agree on a legislative proposal before it is adopted already covers a great deal of EU legislation albeit with the important exceptions of EMU, agriculture, fisheries and fiscal harmonization. Its powers are expected to increase even more, possibly to the level of national European parliaments, in the aftermath of the current convention. European political heavyweights like Gerhard Schroeder and Joshka Fischer have strongly advocated a more important role for the European Parliament. Understanding the effect of enlargement on the functioning of the European Parliament is thus becoming an increasingly important issue. Paradoxically, even though the European Parliament is the only directly elected body in the EU, its activities and functioning are not well known outside a small group of experts. However, this gap is being closed with the establishment of a database covering roll call votes in the European Parliament (NouryRoland, 2002; Hix-Noury-Roland, 2002) . In this paper we use roll call votes for the fourth and the Fifth Parliament (1989-1994 and 1994-1999) to shed light on the issue of the effect of enlargement on the EP. 1 The passage probability is the share of winning coalitions among all possible coalitions of countries in the EU Council. It is an abstract indication of the difficulty of passing a bill.
To do this, we ask several questions to the data. In section 2, we ask whether coalition formation in the EP is mainly based on cross-European party groups along the traditional left-right dimension or on basis of country coalitions. This is important to understand the effect of enlargement on the functioning of the EP. If voting in the EP occurs mostly along ideological party lines, enlargement will mainly increase the size of the EP and possibly affect its ideological composition but it would not fundamentally threaten its ability to operate. On the other hand, if the Euro-deputies vote mainly on the basis of national interests, more power to the EP is likely to increase the number of possible country coalitions and make voting highly unpredictable. The data lead us to conclude unambiguously that voting occurs along party lines which gives ground to be optimistic about the effect of enlargement on the EP.
One reason why cohesion in the EP may be strong is because of the strength of the democratic tradition in member states and the long experience with party systems in national parliaments. One may wonder whether postcommunist countries lacking such long experience will be able to show as strong a party cohesion when entering the EP. This is why in section 3, we give some facts about cohesion of party voting in Poland and the Czech republic for which we were able to gather data. The purpose is to evaluate to what extent the party system has developed in these young democracies and to compare party cohesion in those countries with what we observe in the EP. The data show that party cohesion in those countries is even higher than in the EP.
In section 4, we use the past experience of enlargement to get a feeling of some of the effects of enlargement on the EP. We ask whether MEPs from Sweden, Austria, and
Finland voted more with their European party group when they entered the EP or more with the other MEPs from their country. We find that MEPs from those countries were not less disciplined in terms of voting with their European party groups than MEPs from other countries. We also address the question of whether MEPs from poor countries vote more with their country or with their party on issues of structural funds where one might expect Portuguese, Spanish, Greek and Irish MEPs to vote together. We find once again that party loyalty is more important than country loyalty, even in the case of structural funds.
In section 5, we ask whether enlargement may add new dimensions to coalition formation in the EP. Here we find, using the Poole-Rosenthal scaling method, that the previous enlargement tended to create a North-South dimension with the entry of Finland and Sweden. That dimension plays however a minor role compared to the left-right dimension that plays the major role in the EP. This suggests that the coming enlargement may lead to a new East-West dimension in the European Parliament but such a new dimension may not play a very important role..
Party or country loyalty?
A crucial question in order to understand the effect of enlargement in the EP is These votes pass often by unanimity or near unanimity. Despite representing different ideologies and countries, MEPs generally share the objective of increasing the power of the EP. There is thus a concerted effort in the EP, whenever possible, to appear united in front of the Council and the Commission, especially in case of a conflict between these three bodies. In order to mitigate the effect of these unanimity votes on our average cohesion index, our "weighted" cohesion index takes the cohesion index divided by the observed majority in the European Parliament multiplied by two. Thus a vote with a narrow majority of 50% gets a weight of one and a unanimity vote gets a weight of ½.
When computing the average of those weighted cohesion indexes, we divide them by the average index a perfectly cohesive party would obtain so that a perfectly cohesive group would still get an average of 100%.
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3.
We clearly see that cohesion is much stronger for parties than for countries. The cohesion index for partiesis around 83% in the third parliament and is higher for most parties in the fourth parliament while the cohesion index for countries is around 65% in the third parliament and is lower in the fourth. There is thus roughly a 20% point difference in cohesion. The cohesion of countries is even biased upwards because many national delegations are dominated by one party. 2 Similarly, the large cohesion for Greece, Spain and Luxembourg can be explained by the fact they are mainly affiliated to the two largest political groups. Note however that the cohesion index for France is the lowest of all countries! French representatives are thus the most divided country in the EP, a fact that maybe runs counter to the intuition of many. Note also that cohesion is the highest among the party families reflecting the usual political cleavages in advanced democracies:
socialists ( 
Party cohesion in accession countries.
It is useful to compare party cohesion in the European Parliament with the observations we have from party cohesion in accession countries. We give here figures for the Czech and the Polish Parliament using data from Mielcova and Noury, (1997) and Dobrowolski, Mazurkiewicz and Noury (1999) . Tables 4 and 5 Democrats, the rest of the party system has not stabilized yet.
Despite a relative lack of stability of the party system, the cohesion figures based on roll call votes between 1993 and 1997 in those two countries give us a rather optimistic picture. In both Poland and the Czech republic, the cohesion indices are high.
They are even higher than those for the European Parliament. Note however that the relative cohesion indices do not vary much from party to party. Quite remarkably, in Poland, the biggest party, the SLD has the highest cohesion of all parties. This is not the case for the ODS in the Czech republic.
INSERT TABLES 6 and 7.
It may seem a puzzle to observe that cohesion is higher in the young democracies of former communist countries as compared to the European Parliament. It is however not a real surprise. Contrary to the EU system, those countries have a parliamentary system where party voting tends to be very cohesive. Governments are formed by a majority coalition in the Parliament. The threat of a vote of confidence can always be used to bring down the coalition. This acts as a disciplining device (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2000) . The EU is not a parliamentary system and voting is therefore necessarily less cohesive, such as in the US.
Behavior of new entrants. The lessons from past experience.
In this section, we investigate the effects of enlargement by looking at the voting Of course, one must be careful in drawing firm conclusions from such an exercise. The future accession countries do not have the same economic, cultural and historical background as the countries from the previous enlargement. Moreover, the number of entrants in the future enlargement will be much higher than in the previous one.
Nevertheless, countries from the previous enlargement did have distinct characteristics from the EU. Two out of three were Nordic countries and all had a richer economy than the EU average. It is thus useful to see how MEPs from those countries behaved. In order to do this, we computed for each MEP a "discipline index" measuring the frequency of votes with his or her party group. The discipline index is different from the cohesion index in that it focuses on the voting behavior of individuals rather than groups. Table 8 gives the average frequency of vote of a MEP from a given country with his or her party.
The last column looks at the average frequency of vote with the national delegation. The idea is to compare the relative loyalty of MEPs to their party and to their party group. This is done for the whole of the Fourth parliament since the enlargement to those three countries. The discipline index thus allows to see whether MEPs from new entrants behave differently from other MEPs.
INSERT TABLE 8 We immediately see that MEPs from Finland, Sweden and Austria do not behave in a less disciplined way toward their party group. Finnish socialists and liberals are among the most disciplined in their group. Swedish socialists are less disciplined than the other socialists but only slightly so and Swedish conservatives are very disciplined.
Austrian MEPs are not less disciplined than the others. More importantly, for new entrants the discipline with the national delegation is significantly lower than the discipline with all the party groups. Moreover, the country discipline of the new entrants is not higher than for other countries. It is even among the lowest of all! This tends to strongly suggest that new entrants immediately follow the discipline of their group and do not follow country discipline more than other MEPs. The highest country discipline index is the one for the U.K. It must however be noted that over half of the British MEPs A major difference between the next enlargement and the previous one is that in the latter case entrants were rich countries whereas the accession countries are poorer than Portugal, with the exception of Slovenia. In order to get a feel of the effect of poorer countries entering, it is useful to look at the behaviour of the "current poor" in the EU. In particular, one wants to know whether MEPs from poor countries remain more loyal to their party than to their country whenever there are votes on cohesion and structural funds which benefit poor countries. Here, we may expect national solidarity to be stronger than party loyalty for votes related to these issues. This is an important issue because entry of poorer countries from Central Europe will reinforce the political power of poor countries within the EU. How is this likely to be reflected in the EP? Table 9 shows the discipline index calculated only for votes related to structural funds and cohesion.
INSERT TABLE 9 We unambiguously see that MEPs from Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland do not have lower party discipline than MEPs from the other countries. Party discipline thus tends to dominate even on issues where country interests would seem to take the upper hand. We looked further at the discipline of MEPs on the different issues (tables available upon request from the authors). We found that in general, across issues, party discipline remained stronger than country discipline with a few exceptions. 
New dimensions with enlargement?
So far, our analysis did not pick up any effect from enlargement. Here the spatial analysis developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) proves useful.
The evidence we showed so far indeed only allows to pick up a single dimension of the political space in the European Parliament. However, one of the main findings of the empirical studies of the EU policy making is that there are at least two dimensions to the EU political space (e.g. Hix, 2001 , Noury, 2002 . These studies use the spatial framework developed by Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) for use in the electoral arena and by Black (1948) for use in legislative analysis. The spatial model has become the workhorse theory of modern legislative studies. In particular, the spatial model of voting has been extensively applied to the analysis of roll-call votes in the US Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Heckman and Snyder, 1997 
where ) ( , j i z x δ is the distance between the ideal point of legislator and the vote outcome.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1), the deterministic component of the utility, is a negative function of the distance between the legislator's ideal point and the 'yes' and 'no' outcomes of the vote. Therefore, the legislator is assumed to choose the vote (yes or no) closest to his or her ideal point alternative. The second term on the righthand side of equation (2) is the stochastic component or the error term. It is a random variable and captures the effect of idiosyncratic 'shock' specific to legislator i when voting on roll call j, (i.e. the omitted attributes affecting the legislator's choice).
To estimate the spatial model, one must define a specific functional form for the deterministic component of the utility function and a probability distribution for the error term. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have developed a procedure called NOMINATE to estimate the spatial model of roll call voting. NOMINATE postulates a bell-shape utility function for the deterministic part of the utility and a logit distribution for the error component. NOMINATE is very similar to standard factor models but given that there are a large number of parameters to be estimated and the utility function is bell-shaped, it uses a three-step estimation algorithm. The left-right dimension is however likely to remain dominant. Politicians from Central Europe are very eager to integrate the mainstream of Europe, and in particular its traditional party families. It is thus very unlikely that the importance of the left-right dimension will be substantially reduced.
Conclusions.
We are modreately optimistic about the effect of enlargement on the European MEPs ' Ideal Points, EP 3 (1989 -1994 MEPs ' Ideal Points, EP 4 (1994 -1999 
